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ABSTRACT 
 Regulatory agencies like the Food and Drug Administration are in the business of 
protecting American lives.  These agencies are constantly making judgment calls as to  
whether prospective products are sufficiently safe, whether proposed regulations will do more 
harm than good, and whether costs of compliance will justify the benefits.  And yet, what cost is 
too high to save a human life?  Although we would like to live in a world that needed not spare 
any expense to save a life, we know that ours is a world of scarcity.  This fact requires that we, as 
a society, make difficult decisions about how much to spend to save lives – in other words, how to 
value human life.   
This paper first looks at different theoretical approaches for deriving a value of life, and 
asks which is the most appropriate for use in the regulatory context.  The paper next considers 
the legal framework that plays a role in guiding agencies in the use of value of life figures.  
Finally, the paper examines the practices of regulatory agencies, the FDA in particular, 
regarding setting a value of life, and applying it in their decision-making.  A web of legal 
authority, political pressures, and shear administrative difficulties come into play.  Together, 
these competing influences create significant challenges to the usefulness of value of life analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is submitted to Professor Hutt in satisfaction of the Food and Drug Law course 
requirement and the third year written work requirement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Society makes decisions about how to value life all of the time.  We decide how we value 
our own lives when we take risky actions or make spending decisions concerning our health and 
safety.  Courts value lives when they force defendants to compensate wrongful death victims.  
Governments value lives in countless contexts, including income redistribution decisions and 
imposing a national draft.  Sometimes decision-makers are explicit about placing a value on life, 
but this is more the exception than the rule.  Unfortunately, when decisions are made on an ad 
hoc basis, they often fail to optimize life-saving potential.  For example, imagine a town that 
commits half of its fire department to rescuing a child trapped in a well, but also chooses to 
permit landfills that accept toxic waste.  As the example illustrates, choices about saving lives are 
inextricably linked to money.  Spending to protect one group requires forgoing protection of 
another.  Unless these decisions are made with full consciousness of the cost-life tradeoffs, 
chances are, they may be leaving some attractive life-saving opportunities on the table.  
Questions about how to value life have been explored extensively since the 1970s by 
economists focusing on methodologies, legal scholars focusing on the morality and legal 
authority to do so, and administrators focusing on how to apply such a value.  Because the 
economic literature has become so well-developed, current scholarship has tended to revolve 
around intricacies and minute details about various methods.  While this level of detail is needed 
to advance our understanding of the value of life, it can be difficult to obtain a high-level 
understanding of what is actually involved in valuing life.  One goal of this paper is to provide a 
survey of the current wisdom surrounding the value of life, and to evaluate its suitability for use 
in the regulatory context.  Parts I through III deal with that endeavor.  The legal literature has 
actively explored value of life issues, in particular, their impact on several regulatory agencies.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Occupational Safety and Health 
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Administration (“OSHA”) have received extensive scholarly attention.  Curiously, the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) has escaped all but the most general mentions in this context.  The 
second goal of this paper is to fill in that gap.  Parts IV and V provide some legal context for 
value of life issues.  Because value of life questions are inherently tied to financial choices, much 
of the legal doctrine bearing on them comes under the more general issue of cost-benefit analysis 
(“CBA”).  Finally, Part VI addresses FDA’s practices in detail. 
FDA is a critical federal agency in advancing the health and safety of America.  It 
oversees the safety of 80% of America’s food supply, which amounts to $255 billion of 
commerce.1  Between food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics, every single American 
encounters many FDA-regulated products every day of her life.  And yet, despite its crucial role, 
its budget is naturally limited – amounting to only 0.08% of our national expenditures.2  How 
does FDA decide whether a new regulation ought to be promulgated?  Does FDA think about the 
value of life, and if so, how does its thinking affect its decision process? 
 
I. WHY VALUE LIFE 
 
The process of valuing human life raises a number of significant hurdles.  Moral and 
political challenges almost pale next to the conceptual and empirical difficulties.  That so many 
scholars and government agencies have nonetheless undertaken the task suggests the importance 
of the endeavor.  But why exactly is understanding the value of life important?  Society places a 
value on life in many different contexts.  Courts use it to determine compensation for wrongful 
                                                 
1
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Keeping the Nation’s Food Supply Safe: FDA’s Big Job Done Well, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/factsheets/justthefacts/2cfsan.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). 
2
 The FDA’s proposed budget for the 2003 fiscal year is $1.727 billion.  U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Talk 
Paper, FDA’s Budget Proposal for FY 2003 (Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2002/ANS01135.html.  The 2003 federal budget was $2,128 billion.  Budget of 
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003, Summary Tables, available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy03/browse.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). 
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death, or to create deterrence from future harm.  Individuals constantly make choices that trade 
off our safety for other desires, like a tasty food or a sports car.  Moreover, and the focus of this 
paper, regulators make choices about whether safety-enhancing regulations merit their cost.  “The 
ultimate purpose of the value-of-life literature is to provide some basis for sensitive social 
decisions.”3  The literature has focused largely on two different aspects of the problem:  what the 
appropriate value of human life is, and how to use it in cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”).  
Answering the first question is necessary to determine whether the benefits of a particular project 
or regulation outweigh its costs.  The second question has broader implications for setting 
regulatory policy and prioritizing competing initiatives. 
Regulations naturally have costs – the cost to the government of promulgating and 
enforcing them, and the cost to society (individuals or industry) of complying with them. 
Understanding the full effect of these two types of cost reveals the importance of valuing life.   
From the government’s perspective, knowing the value of human life can help agencies 
make regulatory decisions in two ways.  At the most basic level, they can make better “go or no-
go” decisions by assessing whether the benefits of a proposed regulation, often measured in lives 
saved, outweigh the costs.  Moreover, scholars have thoroughly demonstrated the link between 
income and health and safety, the so-called “wealth equals health” effect.4  Wealthier people 
simply receive better healthcare and avoid more physical risks than poorer individuals.5  By 
comparing death rates and income levels, it has been shown that as a community’s income 
                                                 
3
 W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 19 (1992) [hereinafter, VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS]  
[Monetary estimates of the value of life have] been relied on to argue that  the costs of many 
environmental regulations exceed their benefits, that many regulations are cost-ineffective or that there 
are cheaper ways of saving human lives, that expensive regulations endanger human lives by their very 
expense, and that government does not set priorities in a rational manner, indeed, that risk regulation is a 
‘crazy quilt’ (internal citations omitted). 
Id. at 19. 
4
 Robert W. Hahn, Randall W. Lutter and W. Kip Viscusi, Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? 6 (AEI-Brookings 
2000) (chronicling the literature on this topic). 
5
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 29. 
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increases by about $10 million, it will experience one fewer death.6  Therefore, the cost of 
compliance to society actually imposes risks on people’s lives.7  Agencies ought not promulgate 
regulations that raise society’s compliance costs unless they generate a sufficiently offsetting 
benefit.  Agencies must understand the value of life to make those determinations.  Using too 
high a value of life in a cost-benefit analysis could result in an agency undertaking costly and 
unworthy regulations, while using too low a value could cause agencies to forego valuable life-
saving regulations.8 
With a more sophisticated process, government agencies can use the value of life to 
compare and prioritize all of their initiatives – ranking those with the lowest cost per life saved 
highest.  In our world of scarce resources, agencies constantly forego certain projects in order to 
pursue others deemed more important.  For example, while FDA has devoted enormous attention 
to certain dietary supplements in recent years, it has all but ignored monitoring of the cosmetics 
industry.  It undoubtedly follows this course because its commissioners have believed that it 
could better protect the public by monitoring Ephedra, for example, than cosmetics.  An analysis 
comparing the two using a constant value of human life could confirm or disprove this.  The 
importance of this prioritization cannot be overstated.  Tengs and Graham estimated that the 
government commits the “statistical murder” of 60,000 people per year by misallocating its 
regulatory resources.9 
                                                 
6
 See Randall Lutter and John F. Morrall, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 
J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 43 (1994).   This represents a refinement of original estimates which placed the expenditures levels 
results in a statistical death at $50 million.  See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 
2 AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 217,  n21 (2000) [hereinafter Viscusi, Legal Contexts]. 
7
 See generally Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 195, 200 (explaining the development of risk-risk analysis). 
8
 This assumes that regulatory monetary costs are being compared to a benefit which includes lives saved.  This is the case 
in the vast majority of federal agencies’ regulatory impact analyses I have examined.  If a regulation’s costs include the 
non-monetary increased risk of death, the impact of inaccurate estimates of the value of life could be the reverse. 
9
 Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Cost of Haphazard Social Investments in ROBERT W. HAHN, LIFE-
SAVING, IN RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED, 172, 176 (1996) (“Retaining our present pattern of investments … we could 
more than double the life-saving potential of our current investments”). 
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Project prioritization can be taken to the next level by using such analysis to allocate 
resources across agencies.  Agencies jockeying for funds and clout naturally have incentive to 
manipulate their estimates of the value of life to demand bigger budgets.  The use of a consistent 
value of life would reduce (though certainly not eliminate) the ability of government agencies to 
use cost-benefit analysis as a political tool.  Further, such comparisons could help eliminate any 
insipid discrimination in the government.  For example, it would help expose whether agencies 
that predominantly served particular segments of the population were over- or under-funded.  It 
could compare the efficiency of programs focusing on urban poor, like those created by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, with, for instance, farm subsidy programs.  A 
consistent value of human life could help the legislature appropriate resources across agencies to 
protect the greatest number of lives, promoting equity and fairness. 
In addition to the efficiency benefits of valuing human life, the practice also promotes 
predictability.  In a heavily regulated industry like the drug industry, daily business decisions 
require predictions about what FDA will do.  If FDA used a constant and published value of life, 
companies under its purview could incorporate this into their decision calculus.  While certainly 
such a number would not substitute for agency discretion, the more transparent and consistent the 
agency’s decision-process, the better the industry will be able to tailor its behavior to comply 
with FDA. 
In spite of the important potential uses of a value of human life, vocal critics argue against 
it.  Criticisms fall into two camps: positive and normative.  Positive critiques include charges of 
political manipulation, empirical difficulties of measuring the value of life, and methodological 
questions, like the choice of a discount rate.  These will be discussed below in the section 
exploring the difficulties of valuing life.10  This part will explore the main normative critique: 
                                                 
10
 See infra Part III. 
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that placing a monetary value on human life is immoral.  Proponents of this view believe that we 
as Americans view life as sacred and priceless.11  To monetize life, they argue, ignores life’s 
intrinsic value and treats people as commodities.  This is insensitive and worse, an inappropriate 
undertaking for the government.  While the moral critics seem correct to observe that placing a 
value on human life is indeed crass and unpleasant, they neglect certain realities.  The first reality 
is that decisions trading off life and health for money occur all the time.  The government makes 
such tradeoffs when funding certain social programs over others.  We, as individuals, also make 
such tradeoffs.  For example, many of us choose means of transportation based on the cost and 
speed rather than the risk.  Similarly, we may forgo preventive medical treatment due to high 
cost.  To pretend such tradeoffs do not exist merely causes them to be made implicitly, and hence 
more arbitrarily.  The second reality is that choosing not to value life has moral consequences 
potentially as severe as choosing to do it.  As explained above, allocating resources inefficiently 
can amount to statistical murder.  Advocates of valuing life argue that it raises no unique ethical 
issues not already dealt with by regulators.12  In short, while the moral critique is not meritless, it 
seems to be outweighed by other practical and moral reasons to value life. 
 
II. METHODS OF VALUING LIFE 
 
 As observed above, valuing human life can serve numerous purposes.  The appropriate 
method of valuation depends on the context for which the value is to be used.  The methodology 
and context will impact the actual dollar value arrived at.  Although this might seem unsettling, it 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal 
Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 968 (2001). 
12
 See, e.g., VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3 at 32. 
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should not be.  It merely reminds us that there is no one true or natural value of human life, but 
rather that it varies by the person, the circumstances, and the question at hand.13 
 The arrays of methods can be broken down into two general categories: ex post and ex 
ante valuations.  Ex post valuations are generally used to value of the life of a known individual 
or group that has died.  Because the specific victims and outcomes are known, these valuations 
can be used to compensate individual losses, as in the case of wrongful death damages or the 
September 11th Fund.14  Ex ante valuations estimate the value of a “statistical life,” or the life of 
an unknown member of a known population.  These estimates are more useful for making 
normative policy and specific regulatory decisions.  In this paper, unless specifying an ex post 
value, I will use “value of life” to mean the value of a statistical life. 
 
Ex Post Valuation 
 
The most prevalent ex post valuation method is the human capital approach.  It developed 
from Adam Smith’s idea in the 18th century that the monetary value of a person could be 
measured by his or her output.15   
The basic approach involves calculating the present value of an individual’s lost earnings.  
Today’s methodology has become more complex to capture many different aspects of lost human 
capital.  In particular, seven variables are considered to measure a person’s human capital:16 
1) Base year income – Earnings at the time of death can be computed using observable 
salary information, or tables of weekly median earnings published by the Census 
Bureau.17  This is quite straightforward. 
                                                 
13
 See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 195. 
14
 See id. at 197 (arguing that the human capital approach is appropriate for compensating individuals, not prevention). 
15
 Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 876, 876 (1989). 
16
 See Elizabeth M. King and James P. Smith, Computing Economic Loss in Cases of Wrongful Death, Rand: The Institute 
for Civil Justice (1988), for a discussion of the seven variables. 
17
 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, Labor Force, Employment and Earnings, Table No. 
613. 
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2) Salary growth – This depends on three components.  First, productivity growth in the 
overall economy is considered.  Second, knowledge of the economic life cycle of 
earnings is used.  Certain patterns of salary growth are commonly observed across 
workers.  Salaries tend to rise early in one’s working life, peak around the 40s or 50s, 
then gradually decline.  Third, the individual’s specific productivity and trajectory is 
considered.  This tends to be one of the most subjective inputs in the human capital 
model. 
3) Work life expectancy – This calculation estimates how much longer the individual 
would have continued to work before the event in question.  It considers current 
working status, life expectancy, probability of unemployment, education level and 
gender.18  The table commonly used is controversial for several reasons.  First, being 
over fifteen years old, it is thought to underestimate women’s working years and 
overestimate men’s.  Second, it uses education level as a proxy for probability of 
unemployment although some dispute the correlation. 
4) Nonmarket loss – This input improves on Adam Smith’s model by taking productive 
activity outside the workplace into account.  It primarily captures time spent on 
housework, relying on studies of individual time budgets.19  The debate over this input 
concerns whether to value time spent on housework at its replacement cost (the cost of 
hiring an outside housekeeper) or at the higher opportunity cost (the income the 
homemaker could have otherwise earned). 
5) Personal consumption offset – This capture the notion that two can live more cheaply 
together than one.  The idea is straightforward. 
                                                 
18
 U.S. Department of Labor, Work Life Estimates, 1986. 
19
 F. Thomas Juster and Frank P. Stafford, Times, Goods, and Well-Being (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1985) 
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 7.3. 
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6) Taxes – Consideration of tax captures the reduction of income the individual would 
have faced from paying income tax, but also the tax that survivors will owe on any 
investment return on the damage award. 
7) Discount rate – This takes into account the time-value of money, or the idea that a 
dollar today is worth more to us than a dollar next year.  While the theory is 
uncontroversial, there is no consensus on the appropriate discount rate, and different 
choices can wildly affect the final value of life.  In the human capital context, the 
impact is minimal because a number between two and four percent is commonly 
used.20  However, as is discussed below, the choice of a discount rate is one of the 
biggest challenged facing ex ante valuations.21 
 The human capital approach has several important benefits.  The largest is its capacity to 
tailor valuations to specific individuals.  This makes it particularly appropriate for individual 
wrongful death computations.  In addition, its simple process of pulling several numbers off of a 
table makes the valuation highly transparent and unambiguous.  Once the tables are agreed upon, 
there is limited room for manipulation.  Its simplicity also makes multiple calculations easy to 
administer.  This could be one of the reasons the human capital approach was used by the 
administrator of the September 11th Fund.22   
 In spite of its benefits, the human capital approach does have some large disadvantages.  
The first is its unsuitability for use in policy decisions.   Because its values are calculated 
according to extremely specific personal data, it does not make sense to use it to estimate the 
impact of a potential harm on a large, heterogeneous population.  However, even when used in 
                                                 
20
 Professor Joni Hersch, Empirical Methods for Legal Analysis, Course Pack , Harvard Law School (Fall 2003). 
21
 See infra Part III, Discount Rate. 
22
 However, not everyone agrees with how the human capital approach was used to compensation September 11th victims.  
See, e.g., William Glaberson, Lawyers’ Math in Sept. 11 Deaths Shows Varying Values for Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2001, B1; Jon E. Hilsenrath, Economist Criticize Sept. 11 Fund Over Its Formula for Compensation, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Jan. 7, 2002, A22.  
 11 
appropriate contexts, the method gives rise to three main difficulties.  First, there are debates 
about whether the seven inputs capture the complete picture.  For example, some argue that 
person’s net consumption should be subtracted.23  Others complain that it neglects to value 
noneconomic activities, like the value of leisure time.24  Taking those shortcomings together 
yields the disturbing and clearly erroneous result that the death of children or the elderly could be 
a net positive for society.  Second, there is a theoretical debate about whose value the human 
capital approach really captures-- perhaps it describes the value of a man to his family, but not to 
society.25  Third, some believe that the methodology is inherently discriminatory.  Because some 
of the tables give different values by race, and many differ by gender, women and minorities 
consistently receive lower values of life.26 
While this method is still used by courts in wrongful death cases, it has long fallen out of 
favor for use in policy settings.27  No government agency relies on this methodology for 
determining the value of life, with the exception of the Department of Transportation, which uses 
a variant of this method that involves estimating future earnings.28 
Ex Ante Valuation 
 Ex ante valuations estimate the value of life before an actual death occurs.  Because these 
techniques are used to calculate the value of life before it is known who will die, they rely on 
society-wide data rather than individual-specific information.  For this reason, these methods are 
said to yield the value of a “statistical life.”29  While some find the terminology objectionable, it 
                                                 
23
 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 877. 
24
 See id. 
25
 See id. 
26
 See id. at 878. 
27
 In 1989, Gillette and Hopkins provided an early comprehensive look at value of life literature and its implications for 
regulatory policy.  See Clayton Gillette & Thomas Hopkins, Federal Agency Valuations of Human Life, A Report to the 
Administrative Conference of the United States 386-87, 398 (1989) (arguing that this method could still be useful to 
develop policy to stimulate economic growth); see also Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 214. 
28
 See infra note 163.  
29
 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2000 (1998) [hereinafter 
Heinzerling].  This terminology has also been adopted by several federal agencies employing value-of-life analysis, e.g., 
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seems appropriate when the purpose is forward-looking deterrence rather than individual 
compensation. 
Willingness-to-Pay 
Since the 1970s, the most accepted methodology by both economists and policy analysts 
for performing ex ante valuation is the willingness-to-pay method.30  The basic approach is to 
analyze how much people will pay to avoid different physical risks including the risk of death.31  
It was first conceived of in 1968 by Thomas Schelling, although the concept was suggested much 
earlier by Adam Smith’s theory of compensating differentials.32  Smith realized that workers 
would demand higher compensation for jobs that imposed higher risk.   
 Two techniques, relying on different types of empirical data, are used in these value-of-
life computations.  The more common, known as the hedonic pricing method, infers a value of 
life using observable market behavior.33  As some of the most readily available data is from the 
labor market, economists have particularly studied the extra wages that are paid for risky jobs.34  
Analysis confirms that laborers do require higher wages for riskier jobs.  For example, mining 
and construction tend to have the highest hourly wage among blue collar jobs, and they also have 
the highest fatality rates.  Economists use regression analysis to control for other factors that 
could explain the difference in wages, such as education level or years of experience.  Consumer 
behavior, such as the purchase of smoke detectors or the demand for products that enhance health 
                                                                                                                                                              
the U.S. Coast Guard, 61 Fed. Reg. 13284 (Mar. 26, 1996), the FAA, 56 Fed. Reg. 48370 (Sept. 24, 1991), the EPA, 66 
Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001), the USDA, 68 Fed. Reg. 34208 (Jun. 6, 2003), and the FDA, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062 (Feb. 6, 
2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 12500 (Mar. 14, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6062 (Jun. 6, 2003), and 68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (Jul. 11, 2003).  
30
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 73; Miller, supra note 15, at 879, 883; Robert H. Frank & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 325 (2001) [hereinafter Frank & Sunstein].   
31
 The most basic equation is expressed: value of a statistical life = change in income/change in risk.  To control for other 
personal factors that might explain individuals’ different preferences, a regression analysis can be performed.  See Hersch, 
supra note 20, at 191. 
32
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 390. 
33
 See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 325; Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: 
Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 242 (1991). 
34
 See, e.g., Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 206, Table 1 (listing a number of value of life studies based on labor 
market data).   
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and safety, along with behavioral data, like the use of seat belts has also been used in these 
calculations. 35 
   The second technique is called the contingent valuation approach.  This technique 
requires surveys of individuals asking how much they would be willing to pay to avoid a variety 
of risks.  While generally considered less desirable since it calls upon people to make difficult 
estimates that might differ from their actual behavior in the circumstance, it is useful for 
capturing risks not available in the consumer or labor market data.36  In both techniques, large 
amounts of data are aggregated across individuals to obtain the value of an average, or 
anonymous, or statistical life. 
 Two important features of the willingness-to-pay methodology should be observed.  First, 
it does not measure what people would actually be able to pay to avoid death.  This would cause 
clear problems as a statistical life in a wealthy population would be valued more highly than one 
in a poor population.  Second, it is expected that individuals’ willingness to pay for different 
risky behavior will vary.  This is an important reminder that there is no one natural or true value 
of a human life.  It also indicates the importance of the selected population in arriving at a value.  
Anytime a value of a statistical life is used, it should be based upon a wide sample of the relevant 
population.37 
 The willingness-to-pay method enjoys three key benefits which make it so widely 
accepted by economists, and so commonly used by policy-makers.  Perhaps the most important is 
its intuitive appeal of being based on people’s actual preferences.38  Unlike the human capital 
approach that imposes analysts’ interpretations of the source of human value, the willingness-to-
pay method requires no such assumptions.  Along those lines, it captures a more complete picture 
                                                 
35
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 8, 70; Miller, supra note 15, at 880, Frank & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 
325 for some of the observable behavior used in willingness-to-pay calculations. 
36
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 70. 
37
 See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 203.  This will be discussed further infra in Part III.  
38
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 390. 
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of the value of human life, because it does not neglect the soft variables that are included in 
people’s personal behavioral choices.39  Finally, the methodology has the capacity to measure 
more aspects of the value of life than merely the complete value of life compared to death.  By 
looking at people’s behavior in avoiding risk of accidents as well as death, willingness-to-pay can 
be used to estimate the value of injuries and disabilities.40  This could be extremely useful in 
policy analysis when a regulation in question does not impose fatal risks, but does impose other 
lesser risks, for example, the risk of birth defects. 
 In spite of its wide use, the willingness-to-pay method is far from perfect.  Criticisms fall 
into three principle categories:  problems with the conceptual approach, high level problems with 
the methodologies used, and problems with the technical application of the methodology.  
Several additional troubling aspects that apply to all value of life methodologies are discussed in 
detail below.41 
 The primary conceptual problem with willingness-to-pay is that it is not appropriate for 
use in ex post compensation.42  As discussed above, the methodology requires compiling a broad 
range of population data to arrive at an average value.  Individuals within a population could call 
for widely different values of life.  However, even when used in the appropriate ex ante context, 
the method has limits.  Some have a philosophical problem with valuing anonymous lives.43  
Others fault the methodology for focusing only on lives saved and ignoring quality of life or the 
total years of life at stake.44  Economists today have made some refinements in response to that 
criticism.  The Office of Management and Budget of the president (“OMB”) currently 
                                                 
39
 See id. at 390. 
40
 Frank & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 325. 
41
 See infra Part III. 
42
 See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 214. 
43
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27. (mentioning this as one critique of the method). 
44
 Heinzerling criticizes Morrall, the author of the seminal study estimating the value of human life using the willingness-
to-pay methodology, for this narrow focus.  See Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 1985 & 2042. 
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recommends that federal agencies make use of some modern methodologies designed to tailor the 
value of life to those differences.45  
 Four high level critiques of the technique primarily attack assumptions implicit in the 
methodology.  Each of these suggests that the methodology systematically undervalues human 
life.  The first deals with the method’s focus on how an individual values her own life.  This 
neglects the losses suffered by others, such as her family.  By ignoring these externalities, the 
method underestimates the value of life.46  Second, focusing on the labor market could distort and 
undervalue life.  The riskier jobs are blue collar work.  White collar jobs tend not to be 
incorporated into the analysis.  The result is that calculations tend to be based on blue collar 
behavior, while wealthier people probably have a higher willingness to pay.  Third, the method 
assumes that people only care about their absolute living standard, and it only captures this value.  
Frank and Sunstein challenge this assumption, asserting that humans care very much about their 
relative economic position.47  Finally, the methodology assumes that people have free mobility 
and can choose their jobs with no constraints.  This neglects obvious realities of the labor 
market.48 
 Even if everyone agreed that both the theory behind willingness-to-pay and its 
methodology were sound, arriving at actual dollar values poses its own set of practical 
challenges.  First, to solve the willingness-to-pay equation for the value of life, the actual risk of 
the jobs or behavior in question must be known.49  However, as Lisa Heinzerling demonstrates, 
there is not uniform acceptance of these various risk levels, and variations can significantly 
                                                 
45
 Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis, at 30 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf [hereinafter OMB Circular]. 
46
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 393. 
47
 Frank & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 326 and generally. 
48
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 392. 
49
 See the basic value of life equation, supra, note 31.  
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impact the final number.50  Because the behavior or jobs in question typically have very low 
fatality rates, problems arise when analysts attempt to extrapolate, for example, from animal 
studies or high does to low dose.51 
 Beyond understanding the magnitude of the actual risks, the analysis relies on individuals’ 
estimates of the risks they face.  If people misjudge the riskiness of a certain behavior, or behave 
irrationally, their choices reflect a willingness to pay for something other than what they are 
getting.  Unfortunately, a significant body of literature has documented individuals’ tendency to 
make mistakes in estimating physical risks.52  For example, people tend of overestimate the 
chance of low-probability events that have often been called to attention and the chance of 
particularly catastrophic events.53  At the same time, people often undervalue the likelihood of 
small ubiquitous risks.54 
 Once proper estimates of the risks have been made, economists perform a regression 
analysis to control for other factors that might explain the variation in wages or behavior.  While 
it is essential to take these factors into account, doing so also complicates the analysis.  
Specifically, multicollinearity may result.55  Multicollinearity occurs when several variables in an 
econometric model are correlated with each other.  If any variables are correlated with the 
variable in question (here, how well risk explains wages), the importance of that variable can be 
masked.  On the flip side, ignoring important explanatory factors leads to an econometric 
problem known as omitted variable bias (“OVB”).  The result of OVB is that the importance of 
the variable in question will be overstated.  These problems do not invalidate the willingness-to-
                                                 
50
 See Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 2025-39. 
51
 See id. at 2057. 
52
 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 883; Hahn & Hird, supra note 33, at 242; Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 392. 
53
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 70; Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 394-95. 
54
 Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 394-95. 
55
 Hahn & Hird, supra note 33, at 242 (discussing possible problems of multicollinearity and omitted variable bias). 
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pay methodology.  They merely call for a careful examination of how each individual analysis is 
performed.  
 In sum, although the willingness-to-pay methodology is generally accepted for use in 
policy analysis, the devil lies in the details.  As evidence of the difficulty in performing the 
computation, see Table 1, below, comparing a variety of academics’ willingness-to-pay studies.   
Table 156 
Estimates of Value of Anonymous Life,  
By Type of Study 
(in 2003 after-tax dollars, millions) 
Average of 29 Studies $ 3.3 
Range of Extra Wages for Risky Jobs 1.7-5.2 
Demand and Price 
    Safer Cars 3.2  
    Smoke Detectors 1.7-3.0 
    Houses in Polluted Areas 3.9  
    Life Insurance 1.8  
Behavior 
    Pedestrian Tunnel Use 3.0  
    Safety Belt Use 2.2-5.2 
    Speed Choice 2.2-2.7 
    Driver's Travel Time 1.7-2.0 
Surveys 
    Cancer 4.0  
    Safer Bus 4.4  
    Safer Job 3.4  
    Auto Safety 3.7  
 
The author who compiled the table evaluated each study to verify its quality, and converted each 
value into consistent terms.  Nonetheless, values range from $1.7 million to $5.2 million.  
Miller’s table found academic estimates to vary by a factor of 3, but he notes that another study 
uncovered values that vary by a factor of 5, and still another found enormous variations of over 
120 times.  A more recent study, in Table 2, with values more in line with the current wisdom 
                                                 
56
 Reproduced from Miller, supra note 15, at 881, Table 1.  I have converted his table from 1985 dollars to 2003 dollars 
using the consumer price index (“CPI”).  See U.S. Dept of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, 
available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).  I use the CPI throughout the 
paper, where noted, to convert values into 2003 dollars. 
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illustrates not only the variation in overall willingness-to-pay estimates, but also how individuals’ 
willingness to pay to avert death can vary according to the cause of death: 
 
 
Table 257 
Mortality Values by Cause of Death 
Category Value Estimates (in 2003 dollars, millions) 
 
Low Medium High 
Unforeseen instant death 1.2 2.5 6.2 
Asthma/bronchitis 1.6 3.1 6.8 
Heart disease 1.5 3.4 7.4 
Emphysema 1.7 4.3 11.1 
Lung cancer 1.8 4.9 11.7 
 
The broad range of values used leaves some in the field skeptical and reminds us that 
willingness-to-pay is a very indirect method of estimating the value of life.58  Nonetheless, it is 
clearly more appropriate than the human capital approach for FDA’s purposes of making ex ante 
policy decisions.  Perhaps the difficulty of arriving at a precise value suggests that its proper use 
is on an advisory level rather than in a nondiscretionary manner.  This possibility will be raised in 
the paper’s conclusion.   
 
Retrospective Analysis 
 An alternative method is available which does not fall neatly into the ex post or ex ante 
categories.  This method is useful only to consider the value of life in the context of regulation.  
The process involves simply dividing the total cost of a regulation by the actual or expected 
number of lives saved to arrive at a cost per life saved.  I call this “retrospective analysis.”59   
                                                 
57
 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 81, Table 6  (1995) (taken 
from George Tolley, et. al., Valuing Health for Policy: An Economic Approach, 342) [hereinafter Pildes & Sunstein].. 
58
 See Hahn & Hird, supra note 33, at 242. 
59
 Retrospective values have also been cited as part of a “regulatory scorecard.”  See Richard W. Parker, Grading the 
Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003).  
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While the concept itself is straightforward, applying the method is far from it.  The 
method suffers many of the same trappings as the willingness-to-pay method.  It involves 
discounting decisions, quantifying the overall cost of a regulation, and difficulties distinguishing 
between lives extended versus totally saved, or improvements in quality of life.60  John Morrall, 
an economist in the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) performed the seminal analysis 
using this method in 1986.61  Several other scholars have done similar analyses since then.  While 
all of their studies have been used to condemn federal agencies for promulgating widely cost-
inefficient regulations, the studies themselves have also been the subject of much critique.62  One 
cynic concluded that “the studies … are so fundamentally flawed that they prove nothing at all 
about the rationality of regulation.”63 
In spite of the critiques, the method provides the unique advantage of being available to 
evaluate and compare agencies’ decisions even when they are not explicit about the use of a 
value of life estimate.  Therefore, retrospective analysis will be used below to compare “official” 
valuations of human life with the de facto, or retrospective values that different agencies place on 
life.  Specific flaws in the method will be discussed at that point. 
 
III. SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES IN VALUING LIFE 
 Three difficulties, present in every methodology currently available, arise when setting a 
value on human life: discounting, political manipulation, and special populations.  These issues 
are so large that they threaten the legitimacy of any final value to both the public and the 
                                                 
60
 See id. (critiquing the use of retrospective values as a means for evaluating government performance). 
61
 John F. Morrall, III, A Review of the Record, 10 REGULATION 25, 30, Table 4 (1986); see Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 
1983 and n2 for a list of scholars who have relied on Morrall’s tables). 
62
 The most comprehensive critique of all of the major retrospective studies is Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, 
Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State Comment: The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory 
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648 (2002) [hereinafter Heinzerling & Ackerman]. 
63
 Parker, supra note 59, at 1355.  Heinzerling also provides an in-depth critique of Morrall’s methodology.  See 
Heinzerling, supra note 29. 
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academic community.  It is therefore essential that, at a minimum, they be dealt with 
transparently. 
 
Discounting  
 
 Discounting is the concept that something is worth more today than it will be in the 
future.  It is uniformly accepted and applied in the financial sphere.  For example, when valuing a 
bond, the future coupons are discounted according to when they will be received – the further off 
in the future, the less they are worth.  Discounting in the context of valuing human life raises 
three distinct questions:  1) whether to discount life; 2) if so, what lives to discount; and 3) how 
to choose a discount rate. 
Whether to Discount Life 
 To understand the significance of the discounting decision, we must examine how exactly 
discounting affects the value of life.  The short answer is, it values lives saved today more than 
lives saved in the future.  Therefore, when “lives saved” are being plugged into a cost-benefit 
analysis as a benefit, the total benefit will be lower if discounting is applied.  In an extreme 
example, “[a]t a discount rate of five per cent, one death next year counts for more than a billion 
deaths in 500 years."64  While few policy decisions contemplate impact out to 500 years, 
environmental regulations can often have impacts that span significant time horizons, like 
emissions regulations to control global warming, or anti-dumping rules to protect water sources.  
Food and drug regulations can also have long term impacts, for example, if they affect 
reproductive health or latent cancer risk.  Lisa Heinzerling demonstrated how dramatically 
discounting can impact a cost-benefit analysis.  She found that many regulations promulgated 
                                                 
64
 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984); see also Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous 
Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 NW. L. REV. 706, 742-43 (1998)  ("If a 
human life is considered to be worth $8 million and a ten percent discount rate is chosen, then the present value of saving a 
life one hundred years from now is only $ 581.") 
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over the past 30 years, including health and safety regulations, have benefits exceeding their costs 
if human lives are not discounted, but do not pass cost-benefit analysis when life is discounted.65 
 The decision whether to discount life has moral implications.  It means that we choose to 
value our own lives more than the lives of future generations.  I believe that this is not obviously 
right or wrong.  But it should be understood that such a choice is inherent in any value of life 
methodology.  Proponents of discounting argue that since the costs in a CBA are typically 
discounted, all benefits should be as well to be consistent.66  This seems reasonable if we choose 
to view lives as commensurate with dollars.  The mere exercise of setting a value on human life 
suggests some truth to that view.  Heinzerling argues that it is philosophically equivalent to the 
discounting of monetary compensation for the loss of life in the tort context.67  However, those 
who oppose discounting argue that lives and dollars are fundamentally different and that future 
lives are no less valuable than present lives.68  Heinzerling, declining to take a stance, asserts that 
“the decision to discount lives saved in the future involves a choice about values, as to which 
reasonable people may disagree.”69 
What Lives to Discount 
 If one does choose to adopt discounting, the difficulty does not end there.  Richard Revesz 
has argued that the discounting debate has conflated two distinct issues: 
                                                 
65
 Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 1984-85. 
66
 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 941, 944 (1999) [hereinafter Revesz]. 
67
 Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 2043. 
68
 See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A, Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 
629 (1996) ("The practice of discounting future benefits to present value ... biases cost-benefit analysis against future 
generations. A high discount rate clearly biases the analysis against future benefits, even though 'it is not clear why the 
later-born should have to pay interest to induce their predecessors not to exhaust [depletable resources.]'"); Michael B. 
Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 
NW. L. REV. 706, 743 (1998) ("[The] protection of future generations is not merely a matter for accountants. The 
Constitution was adopted in part to 'secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'"); A. Dan Tarlock, 
Now, Think Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169, 173 (1992) ("Speculation about discount rates 
becomes a disguised debate about our ethical duties toward future generations."). 
69
 Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 2044. 
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The first involves harm that will occur to an existing person later in life; the second involves 
harm to future generations.70  To understand the first, consider two forty-year-old men; one faces 
instant death and the other faces potential future harm from exposure to a carcinogenic drug.  
Clearly, the man facing instant death will lose more life-years, and lose them sooner in life.  
Revesz maintains that discounting is appropriate for distinguishing between these two 
scenarios.71     
 The second issue is the one discussed in the preceding section, and more commonly 
debated in the discounting literature.  Revesz believes that discounting the lives of future 
generations is ethically unjustified.  He believes that there is no defensible basis for privileging 
the interests of the current generation, and that discounting of this nature will lead to 
unacceptably lax regulations on future harms like global warming.72 
What Discount Rate to Use 
 
 As explained above, discounting decisions can significantly impact the results of a cost-
benefit analysis.  The choice of how much to discount is as critical as the decisions of whether 
and how to discount.  In finance, a rational basis exists for choosing a discount rate – it should be 
the opportunity cost of a dollar.  The reason that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the 
future is because I can invest the dollar today to turn it into a greater sum in the future.  Thus, the 
appropriate discount rate is typically the risk-free interest rate plus a risk premium.  The analogy 
for human life is unclear.  Is there an opportunity cost to saving a life next year rather than a life 
today?  Is there any risk-free return equivalent in life?  Viscusi believes that just as discounting 
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 See Revesz, supra note 66, generally.  As an example of the first issue, Revesz uses an individual exposed to a 
carcinogen who faces an increased probability of dying in the future, perhaps twenty or thirty years later. For the second, 
he refers to climate change caused by gases in the atmosphere that will harm future generations.  Id. at 945. 
71
 See id. at 1016. 
The use of discounting [in this context], however, will lead to misleadingly low valuations of life unless 
it is coupled with significant upward adjustments to account for the dread and involuntary nature of 
[drug] carcinogens, as well as for higher income levels of the victims. Unfortunately, the regulatory 
regime has failed to recognize the need for such adjustments.  
Id. 
72
 See Revesz, supra note 66, at 948, 1016. 
 23 
human life should be treated the same as discounting the other components of the cost-benefit 
analysis, so should the discount rate be the same.73  For support, he calls upon studies of worker 
valuations of death risks, and expectations about productivity growth.74  Morrall, in his seminal 
retrospective analysis of the value of human life for the OMB, used a 10% discount rate.75  The 
difference between his estimates and those of the agencies he analyzed has been attributed to 
differences in discounting.76  In contrast, discount rates in the human capital approach are 
typically between 2% and 4%.77  While the methods are admittedly different, it is unclear why 
Morrall’s retrospective method, and willingness-to-pay methodology should use a discount rate 
up to 5 times higher than the human capital approach.  I have not identified literature dealing with 
this discrepancy.  
 Choosing a discount rate is far from an abstract problem.  Federal agencies use widely 
different discount rates ranging from 0% to 10% in conducting cost-benefit analyses, and to 
discount the value of life.78  There is even variation in the rate used within a given agency.  In this 
respect, FDA is equally guilty as other federal agencies.79  The importance of these variations 
cannot be overstated.  Even if all agencies valuing life and performing CBAs were in complete 
agreement as to the theoretical methodologies, their numbers would be absolutely incomparable 
without consistent discounting.  
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 VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 55 (“[T]here is no evidence to indicate that we should use a different rate of 
discount when weighting the long-term health benefits of polices that affect life extension as compared with other benefit 
and cost components that these policies many have.”). 
74
 VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 145; see also Revesz, supra note 66, at 947 (“Because there are essentially 
no empirical studies of the value of lives threatened by latent harms, regulatory analyses must adapt valuations derived 
from threats of instantaneous death in workplace settings.”). 
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 Morrall, supra note 61, at 28.  Today, the OMB has changed its recommended discount rate to 7%.  See OMB, Benefit-
Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. at 53520 (1992). For a critique of the OMB’s choice of discount rate, see 
Revesz, supra note 66, at 948, 983 (arguing that the use of an inflated discount rate by the OMB artificially undervalues 
life). 
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 See Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 2018.  
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 Hersch, supra note 20. 
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 See the table in Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are 
Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1146 (2000) [hereinafter Adler & Posner].  See also Edward R. Morrison, Judicial 
Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1364-69 (1998) (finding that 
discount rates used by federal agencies in cost-benefit analyses have ranged from 2-10%). 
79
 See infra Part VI.   
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Political Manipulation 
 
 An obvious benefit of assigning a quantifiable value to human life for use in cost-benefit 
analysis is that it gives policy-makers an objective standard for making decisions.  However, it 
would be naïve to imagine that a political appointee could be immune from political or pressure, 
or could perform a completely nonpartisan cost-benefit analysis.80  For example, a commissioner 
of a large federal agency could greatly increase the amount of federal regulation by tweaking 
upward the value of human life.  This could be done quite subtly by lowering the discount rate, or 
a number of other means.  Presidents and White House executives have deliberately distanced 
themselves from the numbers to avoid the political firestorm.81   
 There are three reasons why potential for political manipulation should not condemn the 
entire exercise of valuing life.  First, although it may be realistically impossible to eliminate all 
partisanship from value of life estimates, some political input is not necessarily bad.  Federal 
agencies are led by appointed officials.  Political heat is most likely to come from elected 
officials, like congressmen or the president.  It is appropriate for elected officials to engage in 
oversight of appointees.  Political influence is, in a sense, the democratic process at work.  
Second, who would be in a better position to handle the valuation of life than the government?82  
If it is left to the private sector, industry groups will manipulate the numbers downward to limit 
the regulation imposed on them.83  As discussed above, if valuation is not done explicitly, it will 
                                                 
80
 See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and 
Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1794 (2002) (arguing that governmental cost-benefit analysis tends 
to systematically underestimate costs due to its conservative genesis) [hereinafter Rascoff & Revesz]; see also Steven 
Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (2003) 
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 Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 375. 
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 ROBERT H. BLANK, LIFE, DEATH AND PUBLIC POLICY 135 (1988) (arguing that valuation of human life should be the 
province of the government). 
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 Industry already does this in providing the government with cost estimates to assist in agencies’ cost-benefit analyses:   
Knowing that the agencies are less likely to impose regulatory options with high price tags (or to 
support them during the review process), the regulatees have every incentive to err on the high side. 
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occur implicitly and in an ad hoc manner through the prioritization of regulations.  Finally, it is 
possible to create checks on the valuation process to ensure fairness.  Perhaps the strongest check 
is transparency.  Transparency ensures that the numerous scholars who have long studied this 
field observe the process, and bring flaws to light.  It also makes it harder for a new 
administration to come in and subtly alter the value to further a political agenda.  Hence, while 
political manipulation is a reality, this is merely a reminder of the need for oversight over the 
regulatory cost-benefit analysis process. 
 
Special Populations 
 
 As discussed above, there is not one universal value of life.  In the human capital 
approach, individuals’ expected future earnings will vary widely.  Similarly, using the 
willingness-to-pay method, results will depend upon whose willingness to pay is being measured.  
In the human capital approach, when being used for tort compensation, this poses no problem.  
Indeed, the method’s flexibility is in part what recommends it most for that use.  However, the 
impact on ex ante decisions of variations resulting from the willingness-to-pay method is more 
troubling.  A hypothetical example will illustrate the potential problem.  The Department of 
Transportation is deciding whether to allocate its funds toward a new airline safety regulation or 
improving interstate highways.  It requests that the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) and 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) perform a cost-benefit analysis 
for each project to determine where the benefits most outweigh the costs.  If each agency has 
                                                                                                                                                              
Beneficiary groups can complain about the magnitude of cost projections, but they rarely have the 
wherewithal to second-guess regulatee-generated estimates. The only entities with both the economic 
incentive to exert a leavening influence and the information and expertise necessary to back it up are the 
occasional independent vendors of the safety and environmental cleanup technologies. These entities are  
themselves frequently only subsidiaries of the larger regulated entities or in any event cannot risk 
alienating their potential customers by demonstrating the excessiveness of the cost projections in a 
public forum, hence the unremarkable conclusion that the regulatory process routinely yields ex ante 
cost projections that are likely to be biased upward . …  
Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on 
the American Economy and Policy: Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1997, 1998-99 (2002). 
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done its own willingness-to-pay study, the FAA would certainly have a higher value of life than 
the NHSA since airline passengers are more affluent on average than drivers.84  As a result, 
airlines would be more heavily regulated than highways.  The source of this disparity – the 
affluence of the respective populations – is strange and extremely controversial.85  Similar 
disparities would emerge among regulations that cater to populations of different ages, such as 
the young or the elderly.86   
 One proposed solution to handling special populations was put forth by Frank and 
Sunstein, who argue that willingness-to-pay numbers should be modified based on the elasticity 
of position.87  This involves understanding how different socio-economic populations’ 
willingness to pay would vary as their incomes changed.  Needless to say, this significantly 
complicates the valuation process.  A second solution, also advocated by Sunstein, deals 
specifically with the problem of age.  Economists have developed a methodology under which 
the willingness-to-pay methodology is used to compute the value of a statistical life, as discussed 
above.  This value, then, is broken down further into the value of a statistical life-year (“VSLY”).  
This way, the benefits of regulations can be differentiated between those that extended life a little 
versus those that extend life significantly.  Similarly, regulations that affect the elderly would 
generally be valued lower than those that affect children.88  Federal agencies, including FDA, 
have embraced this refinement.89 
 
IV. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE VALUE OF LIFE 
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 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 28. 
85
 See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 6, at 213. 
86
 See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that since the young have more to lose than the old, they 
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87
 See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 30, at 355. 
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 Cass Sunstein explains why this practice does not amount to age discrimination, and results in maximizing benefits for 
society.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004). 
89
 See OMB Circular, supra note 45, and infra Part VI. 
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No statute or executive order explicitly mentions the value of life.  And yet, its use has 
been a contentious legal issue for over 30 years.  Debates over the use of value of life 
methodologies have essentially been subsumed in the extensive legal history concerning the use 
of cost-benefit analysis.  Because the value of life is an essential component of many regulatory 
CBAs, and possibly all done by FDA, its use and acceptance has risen and fallen (but mostly 
risen) with attitudes toward CBA.  Legal doctrine in its entirety has handled cost-benefit analysis 
almost schizophrenically, in places requiring it, and in others forbidding it altogether.  This, in 
part, can be explained by the fact that each of the three branches of government has during the 
course of multiple administrations, attempted to exert its control, or “legislate” in this area.  It 
might also be the result of a deeper tension concerning the appropriate level of agency discretion 
competing with executive, legislative and judicial oversight. 
 
The Executive Branch 
 
 In some respects, the executive branch has led the charge in promoting agencies’ use of 
cost-benefit analysis.  Although the initial push might have been an effort to limit federal 
regulation, today, CBA has received bipartisan executive support as an important technique for 
managing the efficiency of regulation.  Executive control has issued in two forms: formally, 
through executive orders, and less formally, through actions and recommendations of the Office 
of Management and Budge (“OMB”).  The OMB is the executive office of the president, charged 
with assisting the president in the development and implementation of budget and regulatory 
policies.90 
 The earliest push to have agencies monitor the costs and benefits of their actions began in 
the early 1970s, and was targeted at the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).  In 1971, 
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George Shultz directed agencies to submit significant regulatory proposals to OMB for review.91  
In 1974, President Ford signed the first relevant executive order, which required agencies to 
prepare an Inflation Impact Statement (“IIS”) for every new regulation likely to have a 
substantial economic effect.92  The order required agencies to perform a full analysis of costs and 
benefits, but did not require them to base their decisions on it.93  Ford changed the name of the 
IIS to Economic Impact Statement (“EIS”) to more accurately reflect its focus – financial cost.94  
The goal of requiring the EIS was to shift regulatory debate to questions of efficiency.95  The 
analysis was once again renamed in 1978 by President Carter to a Regulatory Analysis (“RA”).96  
Although Carter’s executive order did not explicitly mention “cost-benefit analysis,” it essentially 
required the same analysis as the others.  It even went one step further in requiring the use of 
some analysis in regulatory decision-making.97   
 In 1981 President Reagan helped catapult the importance of cost-benefit analysis in 
agency decision making by issuing Executive Order 12291.98  For the first time, CBA became a 
key determinant of agency decisions, as agencies were required to demonstrate that the benefits 
of their regulations exceeded the costs.99  Executive Order 12291 also renamed the required 
Regulatory Analysis to its present name, Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”), and gave the 
OMB pre-clearance responsibility for all “major” rules.100  The Executive Order had the 
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politically conservative anti-regulatory premise that regulation should only be used when it was 
more effective than market forces.101  However, it also was premised on a less partisan ideal that 
CBA could be a means of structuring regulations to maximize the net benefit to society.102   
Executive Order 12291 led to the proliferation of value of life estimates.  John Morrall, 
who analyzed the cost per life saved of numerous agency regulations before and after the 
Executive Order, concluded that Reagan’s mandate affected regulatory reform in reducing the 
statistical variance of the value of life by one-third.103 
In addition to elevating the role of CBA in federal agencies, Reagan also increased the 
importance of the OMB.  In 1985, 12291 was followed by Executive Order 12498, which further 
spelled out the role of the OMB in overseeing agency analysis.104  From that point on, the OMB 
has played a significant role in determining the methodology for calculating the value of life, and 
for addressing its proper use.  For example, in 1987, the OMB endorsed the willingness-to-pay 
methodology for use by federal agencies.105  While several agencies had made use of the 
methodology prior to 1987 to comply with the previous executive orders,106 it became much more 
common in agency analysis following the OMB’s endorsement. 
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In line with expectations, President Clinton promptly revoked Executive Orders 12291 
and 12498.  However, he replaced them with his own Executive Order which was surprisingly 
similarly to the prior ones.107  Clinton’s order continued the requirement that agencies assess the 
costs and benefits of major regulations, and maintained the central role of the OMB as the 
repository and overseer of analysis.108  However, Clinton’s rule was a bit more lax in that it 
limited the requirement that agencies provide the extensive cost-benefit analysis to regulations 
meeting the $100 million threshold required by Executive Order 12291, and provided for 
abbreviated analysis for other rules that had been considered “major” by Reagan’s order. 
 Clinton’s order went a long way toward building bipartisan acceptance of cost-benefit 
analysis and valuations of life.  First, by maintaining the emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a 
key decision tool, Clinton demonstrated that this traditional economic analysis was not 
exclusively a political tool for deregulation.109  Second, Executive Order 12866 explicitly 
addressed the benefits side of CBA, emphasizing that enhancing public health and safety and 
protecting the environment were to be included in agencies’ assessment of benefits.110  This was 
significant to liberal critics of CBA who argued that it systematically underestimated the benefits 
of regulation.  While benefits still tend to be more difficult to pin down, the Clinton order makes 
clear that large social benefits should not be discounted merely because they are hard to quantify. 
 In response to the Executive Order, in 1996 the OMB promulgated detailed guidelines for 
agencies to apply in conducting cost-benefit analyses.111  These guidelines directly address many 
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value of life questions.  They continue to endorse the willingness-to-pay methodology, and make 
numerous recommendations for handling questions of discounting, and valuing life-years 
extended, and other improvements to the quality of life.  Above all, they emphasize the 
importance of consistency across regulations and agencies, and call for an explanation for any 
“significant deviations from the prevailing state of knowledge.”112  The OMB’s understanding of 
cost-benefit analysis has become increasingly sophisticated, as it has embraced the concept of 
risk tradeoff analysis, a form of CBA that takes into account the ancillary risks created by 
regulation as well as its more obvious costs and benefits.113  President George W. Bush has 
carried forward the influence of the cost-benefit approach to regulations by appointing John D. 
Graham to head the Office of Information and Regulation Affairs (”OIRA”) in 2001.114  Graham 
has been closely associated with the development of the concept of risk tradeoff analysis.115 
 Recently, the OMB has refined its recommendations concerning the value of life.  
Recognizing the current economic current differentiating the value of life according to life-years 
saved (“VSLY”), it now recommends that agencies perform cost-benefit analyses using both VSL 
and VSLY.116 
While there is great value in the OMB’s detailed spelling out of value of life 
methodology, any specificity naturally opens the door for critics.  For example, Richard Revesz 
has critiqued the OMB’s recommendations for taking valuations from the workplace setting and 
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reducing them by an inflated discount rate.117  He believes that the OMB’s methodology 
systematically underestimates the value of life.118   
 In sum, the current Executive Order governing agency analysis is number 12866, together 
with the corresponding OMB guidelines.  Under Executive Order 12866, agencies must assess all 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select 
regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits, including potential economic, environmental, 
public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity.   As will 
become clear below, this Executive Order is the most controlling authority governing agency-
wide risk assessment practices. 
 
The Legislature 
 As is to be expected due to the nature of the political process, Congress has had much 
greater difficulty than the president in enacting legislation dealing with the valuation of life, and 
even simple cost-benefit analysis.  Although agency-specific legislation does impose a variety of 
analysis requirements on federal agencies, ranging from those which require decisions to be 
justified by cost-benefit analysis to those which outright forbid any such analysis, generic 
administrative laws are silent on life valuation matters.119  No comprehensive legislation with 
specific analytical requirements has been enacted since the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) in 1946.120 
Failed Attempts 
 The lack of comprehensive legislation is not for want of trying.  Serious attempts by 
Congress to legislate in the area of risk assessment began with the 103rd Congress in 1993, by the 
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Democratic majority.121  These efforts focused largely on regulating the EPA.122  The next major 
bill to be introduced was the Contract with America, by Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey.  This 
bill, which ultimately failed, included extensive and stringent cost-benefit analysis requirements 
for all health and safety legislation.123  Between 1993 and 2000, a number of further bills have 
been introduced, and failed, either when turned over to the second legislative house, or on the 
president’s desk.124  While none were successful, they did open up a dialogue and increased 
interest in Congress of acting in this area.   
 If risk assessment is a difficult political route to navigate, the value of life is like a slalom 
course.  Of the numerous attempts to legislate concerning cost-benefit analysis, no bill has 
included any guidance as to the valuation of life, or even as to the quantification of benefits from 
regulation.125 
Governing Legislation 
 
 In the wake of the unsuccessful bills, very little governs federal agencies’ risk assessment 
in the statutory arena.  The most important law is the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act from 
1995.  This act imposes two relevant requirements.  First, any significant regulatory actions must 
be accompanied by a statement that includes "a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the 
anticipated costs and benefits of the Federal mandate … as well as the effect of the Federal 
mandate on health, safety, and the natural environment "126  Second, agencies must "identify and 
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those alternatives select the 
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least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of 
the rule."127  While this act does officially call for the use of cost-benefit analysis, in reality, it is 
of little consequence for two reasons.  First, most of its requirements are already encompassed in 
Executive Order 12866.128  Second, “in keeping with the pattern that we have seen thus far, they 
are silent on how agencies are supposed to value the goods at stake.”129 
 Two other acts have only an ancillary impact on agency cost-benefit analysis.  First, under 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, if a rule has a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, an agency must consider alternatives that would minimize the economic 
impact of the rule on small entities.130  Second, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act helps define when a regulation is “major” for the purpose of congressional 
review.131 
In sum, despite numerous ambitious attempts to systematize cost-benefit analysis 
throughout the federal government, omnibus legislation has failed.  The result is that the 
controlling rules on agencies are Executive Order 12866, agency-specific legislation (discussed 
in Parts V and VI), and limits on agency discretion imposed through judicial review.  This last 
aspect of the law is discussed next.  
 
The Courts 
 In the absence of clear statutory guidance, courts have filled in some of the gaps by 
providing a series of default rules governing agencies in the use of cost-benefit analysis.  In 
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general, courts have been extremely receptive to agency cost-benefit analysis.132  Recent 
decisions that speak directly to risk assessment issues all apply in light of the principle case on 
administrative law, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.133  Chevron lays out a two-
step inquiry for judicial review of agency decision-making.134  Courts must first determine 
whether Congress has directly addressed the relevant question.  If not, the agency is entitled to 
deference in its construction of the statute.  Therefore, it is clear that if a statute unambiguously 
prohibits the consideration of costs or benefits (such as the Delaney Clause), an agency may not 
use cost-benefit analysis in its decision process.  On the other hand, if no statute prohibits such 
deliberation, an agency is probably free to do so. 135   
 The second prong in Chevron goes a step further.  It requires the court to consider 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and not "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion."  Some courts, namely the D.C. Circuit which is the most important circuit court in 
interpreting agency law, have interpreted this prong to require some proportionality between cost 
and benefits.136  However, there is little indication of precisely what cost-benefit ratio will cause 
an agency decision to be subject to reversal.137 
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 Perhaps the strongest court mandate suggesting that agencies could be required to weigh 
costs and benefits in the absence of a statutory prohibition came from the D.C. Circuit in 2000 in 
Michigan v. EPA.138  There, the court was reviewing the EPA’s decision to approve a state plan 
regulating ozone.  The relevant statute provided that all state plans must prohibit "any source or 
other type of emissions activity within the state from emitting any air pollutants in amounts 
which will ... contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any 
other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard 
(emphasis added)."139  The court rejected a straightforward interpretation of “contribute 
significantly” that would have prohibited any consideration of cost.  It instead determined that 
significance should not "be measured in only one dimension," that of "health alone."  Indeed, it 
stated that the question of significance could at times "begs a consideration of costs."140 
 The most recent and significant Supreme Court case addressing risk assessment is 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, from 2001.141  There, the Court sent a mixed message 
about the viability of cost-benefit analysis in the face of statutes that apparently preclude 
consideration of cost.142  Declining to take the latitude of the D.C. Circuit in Michigan v. EPA,  
the court stated that in regard to national ambient air quality standards, consideration of “public 
health” required cost-blind analysis.  However, Justice Stevens wrote an important concurrence 
in which he explicitly embraced modern risk assessment methodologies, namely risk tradeoff 
analysis.143  In light of the somewhat conflicting treatment of regulatory risk assessment by the 
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court, it seems likely that “arguments grounded in direct risk tradeoffs may play a prominent role 
in the judicial review of administrative action.”144 
 
V. HOW CERTAIN FEDERAL AGENCIES VALUE LIFE 
 
Because even the strongest explicit legal mandate calling for regulatory cost-benefit 
analysis (Executive Order 12866) is extremely vague in its expectations and does not even 
mention the value of life, it is not surprising that federal agencies practice widely different 
methods of both determining a value of life, and using that value. 145   
 
Explicit and Retrospective Values of Life Used by Agencies 
 Whether or not agencies explicitly compute a value of life to use in regulatory decision-
making, their choices and allocation of resources result in implicit valuations.  This part 
compares the explicit and implicit values of life used by a variety of agencies.  Explicit numbers 
(defined below) were tracked historically by Miller and Adler and Posner.   I have updated their 
tables with more recent values.  The implicit values have been computed retrospectively by 
several sources by dividing the total cost of a regulation by the lives saved.146  Comparing 
agencies’ explicit value of life with values imputed to them through retrospective analysis can 
offer some insight into whether agency action corresponds with agency analysis.   
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Explicit Values 
 This section compares the explicit values of life used by several federal agencies from the 
1980s to the present.  By explicit, I mean values clearly labeled as a “value of life” or “value of 
statistical life” in an agency’s regulatory impact analysis.  Calling these values “explicit” is 
perhaps euphemistic, as agencies rarely post documents discussing their use of value of life 
numbers within a standardized cost-benefit methodology.147  This section hopes to provide two 
useful comparisons.  First, I examine how value of life estimates have evolved over their past 25 
years of use within various agencies.  Second, I compare values across agencies to determine the 
level of consistency of this critical input in their CBAs.  The difficulty in doing the latter is that 
clear acknowledgements of a use of a value of a statistical life do not appear regularly in either 
regulatory impact analyses or public agency documents.  Therefore, without conducting a 
thorough investigation into each of the examined agencies, this research is only illustrative.  An 
interesting further study would be to compare all uses of value of life estimates by federal 
agencies to detect any more subtle patterns. 
 My results are summarized in Table 3, below.  For a more visual comparison, please see 
Appendices A through E below.  You will see that the variation in values occurs across as well as 
within agencies, and that the accepted values have not clearly risen or fallen over time. 
                                                 
147
 For an exception, see a publication by the EPA’s OAQPS (Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards) Economic 
Analysis Resource Document, 7-17 (Apr. 1999) available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/econdata/6807-305.pdf (the 
document falls short of recommending the use of one value of life across programs with the agency, “it does suggest that 
the central tendency of $5 million … may provide the best starting point.”) [hereinafter OAQPS Analysis]. 
 39 
 Table 3 
Values of Anonymous Life Used by Government Agencies 
Agency 
Value  
in 2003 dollars, millions 
(year established) 
Pre-1993148 1993-1998 Post-1998 
CPSC $ 2.9-3.9 (1981) $5.8 (1996)149 $5.3 (2000)150 
OSHA $ 3.6-5.5 (1983) OSHA apparently espoused no explicit 
values during this period151 
EPA $ 2.9-14.6 (1983) $4.6 (1988)152 
$5.5 (1997)153 
$6.5 (1998) 
$5.5 (1999)154 
$6.4 (1999)155 
DOT $ 1.7-2.5 (1986) $2.1 (1990)
156
 
$3.1-3.5 (1996) $2.8 (2002)
157
 
USDA $1.9 (1985) $1.8, $3.7 (1994)
158
 
$1.9 (1996) 
$5.3 (2001)159 
$4.8 (2003)160 
FDA161 
No apparent 
explicit use 
before 1993 
$1.9-3.8 (1993) 
$6.3 (1993) 
$3.0 (1996) 
$5.6 (1998) 
$5.3 (2000) 
$5.0 (2003) 
$2.2 (2003) 
$5-6.5 (2003) 
 
This table, though illustrative only, suggests the following findings about agencies’ use of 
value of life estimates: 
 Although variation exists both across and within agency practice, values seem to  hover 
between $1.7 million and $6.5 million.   
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 Agencies rarely adjust their values for inflation.  Therefore, the consistency of their 
results might fluctuate more than they realize.162 
 While values varied within agencies, some ordinal comparison of the agencies is possible.  
The DOT systematically uses the lowest estimates.163  The EPA frequently uses the 
highest.  The USDA, and CPSC fall in between, but closer to the EPA.  It is more difficult 
to generalize about the FDA. 
In sum, this high level swath primarily illustrates the degree of variation both between and 
within agencies’ explicit use of value of life numbers.  In assessing whether this amount of 
variation is acceptable, we must ask, is a range of $1.7 million to $6.5 million big or small?  
While in the scheme of all possible values, it does not seem enormous, these numbers vary by a 
factor of 3.8.  That is to say, an FDA or EPA regulation using a value of $6.5 million per 
statistical life could pass a CBA with expenses almost 4 times higher than a DOT regulation 
analyzed with a $1.7 million value of life.  In those terms, this degree of variation seems to 
undermine any potential consistency to be gained from performed CBAs across the board.  
Finally, the degree of variation has not apparently narrowed in more recent years, as uses of the 
value of life have become more common. 
Retrospective Values 
 
Retrospective values, discuss above in Part II, are computed by dividing the total cost of a 
regulation by the number of lives saved.  While difficulties exist with the methodology similar to 
those of the willingness-to-pay method, the advantage of the method is that it does not require an 
agency to be explicit about its use of a value of life estimate.  Rather, the value of life can be 
imputed to agencies based on their regulatory choices.  Three leading scholars, Morrall, Tengs 
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 For example, the FDA used a value of $5 million in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. 
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 This is certainly because the DOT uses the human capital approach rather than willingness-to pay.  See VISCUSI, FATAL 
TRADEOFFS, supra note 3, at 28. 
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and Graham, and Hahn, have each performed their own retrospective analysis of agency 
regulations.  Morrall has updated his own numbers several times since 1986.  In addition, 
Heinzerling has compared Morrall’s estimates to actual agency estimates.  Since a good deal of 
controversy exists as to which is the best analysis, I will provide each of their estimates below in 
Table 4, except Tengs and Grahams.  Their analysis was done in such a way that makes it 
difficult to identify the regulations that correspond to the life-saving measures they analyzed.164  
These sources, the only available data, have two limitations.  First, they do not analyze 
regulations after 1997, and only eight regulations after 1993.  This is particularly unfortunate 
since Executive Order 12866 was issued in 1993.  It would be very interesting to learn whether 
agency practices have become more reasonable since then, although the limited data points 
suggest that they have not.  Second, the data considers very few (four) FDA regulations.  
Although computing my own retrospective values falls beyond the scope of this paper, it would 
be a valuable direction to take further research. 
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 See Tammy O. Tengs, et. al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 J. RISK 
ANALYSIS 369 (1993).  
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Table 4 
Retrospective Values 
in 2003 dollars, millions165 
Agency Regulation Year 
Agency 
Estimates166 
Hahn's 
Estimates167 
Morrall's 
Initial 
Estimates168 
Morrall's 
Updated 
Estimates169 
CPSC 
 Children's Sleepwear Flammability  1973   2.3 1.1 
 Unvented Space Heater Ban  1980   0.2 0.1 
 Childproof Lighters  1993  0.6   
EPA 
 Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive  1983 2.9  49.2 43.7 
 Uranium Mill Tailings/Active  1983 4.6  94.6 62.0 
 Arsenic/Glass Plant  1986 7.9  34.2 18.6 
 Arsenic/Low Arsenic Copper  1986 6.9  1,364.7 31.7 
 Land Disposal  1986 3.9 480.3 6,251.8  
 Solvent/Dioxin Disposal  1986  240.1   
 Underground Storage Tanks  1988  (420.2)   
 Asbestos  1989  22.8 182.4 152.5 
 Hazardous Waste Toxicity  1990  (9,965.4)   
 Wood Preservatives  1990  60.0  7,851,345.3 
 Land Disposal  1990  228.1   
 Water Contamination  1991  30.0   
 Solid Waste Disposal  1991  43,223.5  26,318.5 
 Drinking Water  1992  11,526.3  126,819.5 
 Sewage Sludge  1993  228.1   
 Land Disposal  1994  1,092.6   
FAA 
 Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability  1984   1.1 0.6 
 Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting  1984   1.2 0.8 
 Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection  1985   0.4 0.1 
 Low-Altitude Windshear Equip  1988    1.8 
 Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance  1988    2.1 
FDA 
 DES Cattlefeed Ban  1979   231.0 171.9 
 Food Labeling  1993  0.4   
 Tobacco Sales  1996  (0.6)   
 Quality Mammography  1997  0.4   
HHS  Organ Transplant Data  1998  0.3   
HUD  Wind Standards  1994  (44.4)   
OSHA 
 
 Asbestos  1972 0.8  13.2 11.4 
 Coke Ovens  1976 14.9  110.3 87.5 
 Acrylonitrile  1978 10.3  67.1 70.9 
 Arsenic   1978 29.4  165.2 147.2 
                                                 
165
 All numbers have been converted to 2003 dollars using the CPI. 
166
 Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 62, at 658, Table 3. 
167
 Hahn, Lutter & Viscusi, supra note 4, at 16-17, Table 3-1.  Negative values indicate regulations with negative net costs, 
that is, where the costs are exceeded by cost savings. 
168
 Morrall, supra note 61, at 30, Table 4. 
169
 Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government (1991-1992) 12, Table 2. 
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 Ethylene Oxide  1984 3.6-6.9  45.6 28.2 
 Benzene  1985 3.1  30.5  
 Formaldehyde  1985 37.3 468.3 128,613.8 118,736.9 
 Asbestos  1986 4.6  159.2 101.9 
 Occ. Exp. To Benzene  1987  8.5  122.6 
 Hazardous Chemical Process   1992  (4.0)   
 Occ. Exp. To Methylenedianiline  1992  21.6   
 Asbestos  1994  32.4   
 Occ. Exp. to Methylene Chloride  1997  10.2   
 
 
 In spite of the shortcomings, the data offer several important insights into agency practice.  
First, it demonstrates that DOT (through the FAA) and CPSC behave consistently with their 
explicit values used, as well as value of life literature, with DOT in particular having a very low 
cost per life saved that corresponds with using the human capital approach to valuation.  FDA 
appears, with the limited data available, to be quite reasonable in its cost per life saved, with the 
exception of a 1979 regulation regarding a ban of DES cattlefeed.  However, Morrall’s analysis 
of this regulation was specifically called into question by Heinzerling, who noted that she was 
“unable to locate any source documenting the risks avoided and costs imposed by this rule (other 
than Morrall's own article).”170  On the other hand, OSHA and EPA clearly pay no heed to their 
value of life estimates when promulgating regulations.  Their costs per live saved regularly 
exceed the bounds of what any economist would consider reasonable.   
Second and more importantly, it suggests a truth about agency behavior.  While Gillette 
and Hopkins observed in 1988 that agencies’ values of statistical life tended to converge around 
$1-2 million,171 that clearly does not indicate a convergence in regulatory behavior.  Whether it 
corresponds to an increase in the complexity of cost-benefit analysis literature, or merely to a 
general loosening of agency discretion, retrospective values of life fluctuate tremendously.  
Perhaps this is a general lesson that agency behavior and agency analysis are two separate 
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 Heinzerling, supra note 29, at n392. 
171
 See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 27, at 368. 
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matters.  Therefore, tightening up analysis requirements will only impact behavior if the two are 
mandatorily linked.172   
 
Specific Agency Practices 
 While dozens of federal agencies use a value of life, implicitly or explicitly, in their 
decision-making, their individual statutory frameworks provide more specific guidance as to their 
analytical behavior.  This section zooms in on the EPA and OSHA, agencies with a similar 
mandate to FDA: to protect the public health.  I look in some detail at what they are permitted, or 
required to analyze by law, and how this impacts their use of the value of life.  It should be noted 
that my research into these agencies only skims the surface regarding their legal mandates and 
specific uses of the value of life.  It is intended only to provide a rough comparison to FDA 
practices. 
EPA 
The EPA interprets its primary mission as to “protect human health and to safeguard the 
natural environmental … upon which life depends.”173  Ironically, while the EPA has tended to 
argue that cost-benefit analysis requirements contravene its mandate of protecting the public 
health,174 it has also been among the most active agencies in developing its own methodologies 
and computations regarding the value of life.175  The inconsistency can be explained, at least in 
part, by the varying and often contradictory requirements imposed statutorily on the agency.176  
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 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply With Executive 
Order 12866, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 859 (2000) (noting that "regulations aimed at protecting health, safety, and the 
environment alone cost over two hundred billion dollars annually - about two-thirds as much as outlays for federal, non-
defense discretionary programs. Yet the economic impacts of federal regulation receive much less scrutiny than the 
budget"). 
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 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agency Mission Statement, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). 
174
 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 437 (2001) (EPA successfully defended against the imposition of 
a cost-benefit requirement). 
175
 See EPA, Valuing Reductions in Risks: A Review of the Empirical Estimates – Summary (1983). 
176
 A more cynical explanation would reason that if EPA is to be forced to performs CBAs, it would prefer to have 
dominion over its inputs.  By raising the value of life high enough, almost any regulation can appear analytically justified. 
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For example, certain statutes clearly mandate cost-benefit analysis.  In considering national 
drinking water regulations, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires that the agency perform a 
“health risk reduction and cost analysis,” going as far as to specify the components to be 
analyzed.177  Similarly, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) 
instructs the EPA, prior to the registration of a pesticide, to consider its "risk to man or the 
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits" of 
its use.178  At the same time, the primary provision of the Clean Air Act dealing with the national 
ambient air quality has been repeatedly interpreted to require the agency to consider "public 
health" alone, precluding any weighing of the associated costs.179 
 In line with the unclear direction given to the agency, its use of value of life numbers has 
been erratic and confusing.  In the early days of value of life analysis, the agency used numbers 
that varied from $400,000 to $7 million.180  More recently, the value has settled at approximately 
$6.6 million, when the agency explicitly includes the valuation of life in its analysis.181  However, 
when examined with retrospective analysis, the EPA frequently issues regulations with enormous 
costs per life saved.  For example, a 1990 regulation concerning land disposal had a cost per life 
saved of $228 million, and a 1994 land disposal regulation had a cost per life saved of over $1 
billion.182  A more in depth study of the EPA would be necessary to understand the rationale for 
some of these outlandishly costly regulations.   
However, in the EPA’s defense, three important critiques of retrospective analysis made 
by Heinzerling and Ackerman should be kept in mind.  First, examining regulation through such 
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 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C) (2004). 
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 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (2004). 
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 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 466. 
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 See, supra, Table 4. 
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a lens can lead one to forget that regulations may in fact have other valuable purposes than saving 
human lives.183  The EPA is an agency designed to protect humans and to protect the 
environment.  A policy designed to protect endangered wildlife might have no direct beneficial 
impact on human lives, and yet it might still be a worthy endeavor.  Second, EPA regulations 
could also suffer under a second difficulty of retrospective analysis, one that also plagues 
willingness-to-pay analysis – discounting.184  EPA regulations often involve regulating toxins.  
The most common reason to regulate toxins is to reduce the risk of cancer.  But because cancer 
has a long latency period, the lives saved in EPA regulations have often been discounted heavily, 
a decision that might not be justified.185  Third, Heinzerling and Ackerman point out that many of 
the EPA regulations analyzed above were never actually implemented.186  In some instances, the 
EPA withdrew the regulation precisely because its high cost did not justify the limited benefits.  
In sum, the mere fact that explicit and retrospective values of life do not correspond is not enough 
in itself to condemn agency practices.  The discrepancies should be used, rather, to highlight 
regulations that merit further investigation, and to consider whether the agency is striking the 
appropriate balance between protecting the environment and people. 
OSHA 
 OSHA views its job as “to save lives, prevent injuries and protect the health of America’s 
workers.”187  OSHA’s practices regarding the value of life largely resemble EPA’s, both in 
statutory mandate and actual use.  Statutes appear conflicted as to whether the agency must, may 
or may not weigh costs and benefits in promulgating regulations.  For example, the agency is 
charged with assuring "so far as possible [that] every working man and woman in the Nation 
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 See Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 62, 655-56. 
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 See id. at 656-62. 
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 See infra Section III, Discounting. 
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 See Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 62, at 653-55. 
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 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, OSHA’s Mission, available at 
http://www.osha.gov/oshinfo/mission.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). 
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[have] safe and healthful working conditions."188  It is unclear whether this mandate permits cost-
benefit analysis, but does not require it, or whether it flatly prohibits it.189  On the other hand, 
another statute calls for OSHA to regulate toxic substances "to the extent feasible."190  The 
agency interprets this language as a requirement to weigh the economic practicality of the 
regulation.191   
 Yet similar to the EPA, while OSHA occasionally endorsed formal value of life analysis, 
it promulgates certain regulations that cannot be justified when a reasonable value of life is 
considered.  Early in the life of valuations of life, OSHA engaged in a battle with the OMB as to 
the appropriate value of life.  Compromising between OSHA’s claim of $3 million, and OMB’s 
figure of $1 million, the two settled on a value of $2 million in 1985.192  Today,  OSHA seems to 
decline to espouse any explicit value of life.  However, actual practice confirms lack of any 
commitment to value of life analysis.  A 1985 proposed regulation concerning exposure to 
formaldehyde would have yielded a cost per life saved of over $100 billion, according to 
Morrall.193  Similarly egregious, the agency insisted on tightening hospital regulations limiting 
exposure to ethylene oxide, even though the increased stringency produced no reduction in the 
risk of cancer at all.194   
 OSHA’s mission does not suggest the same easy explanation for its expensive regulations 
as EPA.  Further, while some of OSHA’s most expensive regulations were ultimately rejected, 
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 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2004). 
189
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regulations with costs per life saved of over $100 million were actually implemented.195  
Nonetheless, there could be other legitimate explanations.  Inappropriate or excessive discounting 
might explain some of the exceptionally high costs per life saved.  Further, not all of the 
regulations are attempts to prolong or save lives.  Non-living saving benefits are not reflected in 
the single cost-per-life-saved metric.  In short, the same limitations of value of life analysis 
discussed above should be kept in mind here.  However, that should not stop a regulation with a 
cost per life saved of over $100 million from raising eyebrows and meriting further examination.  
 
VI. FDA VALUING LIFE 
FDA regulations are notorious for systematically depriving Americans of lifesaving drug 
therapies in the name of safety.196  FDA frequently comes under fire for being too slow to 
approve new drugs and devices and for being too risk averse to the detriment of America’s ill.  
This section seeks to answer the following questions:  1) Does FDA’s legislative mandate require 
that it act with risk averseness?  2) How do FDA’s practices surrounding the value of life impact 
its behavior, and how do they compare to other federal agencies? 
 
Is Anything Special About FDA Regarding the Value of Life? 
 
As the previous section demonstrated, federal agencies are no strangers to value of life 
analyses.  However, as has also been discussed, patterns in one agency cannot be inferred from 
any other because of the lack of overarching risk analysis guidelines, and the divergent set of 
mandates governing each agency.  This section explores the complex mandate of FDA and asks 
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the question: is there anything special about FDA that would impact its performance of the 
valuation of human life? 
The answer to the preceding question is, ‘yes and no.’  The Agency’s self-described 
mission statement is the following: 
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, 
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical 
devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation. The 
FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed 
innovations that make medicines and foods more effective, safer, and more 
affordable; and helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they 
need to use medicines and foods to improve their health (emphasis added).197 
 
It is tempting to view the agency as the lone white knight protecting all Americans.  Under this 
conception, one might argue that FDA, because of its special watchdog role, should avoid 
weighing the benefits of the products it oversees, and only conduct analyses of risk, or cost.  
Therefore, it should steer clear of the business of valuing human life, since this only plays a role 
in tallying up the benefits of a new product.  However, FDA does not have a unique claim to 
keeping the American public safe.  In this sense, FDA is no different than many other federal 
agencies whose mandates are to protect the American public.  For example, EPA and OSHA, 
discussed above, seek to protect human health and save lives.  And CPSC sees itself as 
responsible for protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from 
consumer products.198  To argue that all agencies protecting the American public should seek 
only to minimize risk without regard to benefit would result in an oppressively risk-averse world.   
On the other hand, as discussed above, to understand precisely what sort of cost-benefit 
analysis is required, or permitted, or prohibited, we must look to the agency’s statutory authority.  
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 Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Mission Statement, available at 
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Just as EPA and OSHA receive conflicting statutory directives concerning appropriate risk 
assessment, FDA’s statutory framework in this area is confusing and bordering contradictory. 
One other important feature of FDA should be noted.  Because of the nature of the 
products regulated by FDA, approval decisions are frequently made based on extremely limited 
scientific data.199  Primarily ethical considerations, but also time and cost limitations restrict the 
amount of human testing considered sufficient for making approval determinations.200  
Frequently, animal tests combined with small clinical trials will provide the basis for important 
decisions about drug safety and effectiveness.201  Rarely will the type of statistically significant 
epidemiological findings that scientists prefer to rely on be available.  This high degree of 
uncertainty introduces its own major challenges into FDA’s cost-benefit calculus.  The quality of 
a value of life estimate may be entirely overshadowed by FDA’s larger hurdles concerning 
predictability and safety and effectiveness measurements. 
 
FDA’s Legislative Mandate 
 
 FDA’s statutory framework is the result of 100 years of fine-tuning, combined with 
historical happenstance.  As such, Congress has given the agency individualized standards for the 
approval of food, drugs and medical devices and cosmetics.202  In certain instances, the standards 
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even seem internally inconsistent.  At any rate, the Agency’s legislative mandate can only be 
understood product by product. 
Food 
 
 To a large extent, FDA evaluates food exclusively for safety, without regard to offsetting 
benefits.  For example, for food containing no additives, the agency must determine “[i]f it bears 
or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.”203  
Food containers are subject to the same standard.204  Similarly, food additives and color additives 
are to be evaluated based on whether they are “safe” for their intended uses.205  None of these 
standards requires that the agency perform a cost-benefit analysis.  In fact, by focusing 
exclusively on safety, it could be argued that the agency is actively precluded from any CBA.  
However, the recent receptiveness of the courts to CBA suggests that such an interpretation is 
likely to be an uphill battle.206 
 One infamous clause of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Delaney Clause, 
does explicitly prohibit a weighing of costs and benefits.  Regarding the evaluation of the safety 
of food additives, the Delaney Clause states “no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found 
to induce cancer.”207  This clause’s unique zero-risk tolerance standard has been the subject of 
much consternation and debate.208  However, as an indication of the growing acceptance of the 
principles of cost-benefit analysis, after 38 years, the Food Quality Protection Act recently cut 
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back on the sweeping ban.  The Act amends the FFDCA Delaney Clause standard of zero-risk 
tolerance regarding carcinogenic pesticides to a standard of "reasonable certainty that no harm 
will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue."209 
 A second herald of the acceptance of CBA is the amended standards pertaining to dietary 
supplements from the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994.  With this 
amendment,  dietary supplements were given their own standard for evaluation which seems to 
call for a weighing of the costs and benefits:  A dietary supplement is to  be evaluated on the 
basis of whether it “presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”210  This new 
balancing standard, by focusing on the reasonableness of the risk, calls for FDA to consider 
whether dietary supplements have preventive health benefits.211 
 In sum, although most of the standards for evaluating food do not explicitly require a 
weighing of its costs and benefits, the vague statutory language coupled with the tide of recent 
court decisions and congressional amendments suggests a generally hospitable environment to 
such analysis. 
Drugs and Medical Devices 
 The statutory mandates for evaluating drugs and medical devices are generally more 
friendly to a balanced risk assessment review than the food provisions.  After the Thalidomide 
scare in 1962, Congress amended the FFDCA to require drug manufactures to demonstrate both a 
drug’s safety and efficacy.212  Since then, the notion that a drug’s risks and benefits should be 
balanced has appeared many times.  For example, approval of new drugs requires “a fair 
evaluation of all material facts,” including consideration of “whether such drug is safe” and 
                                                 
209
 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2) (2004). 
210
 Id. § 342(f)(1)(A). 
211
 See Meghan Colloton, Comment: Dietary Supplements: A Challenge Facing the FDA in Mad Cow Disease Prevention, 
51 AM. U.L. REV. 495, 524-26 (2002) (evaluating the pros and cons of the DSHEA). 
212
 See Kefauver-Harris Amendments, current version in part at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2004) (defining the term “new 
drug”). 
 53 
“evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports.”213  Medical devices call for a similar 
analysis, requiring “reasonable assurance of safe and effective performance.”214   
Hence, one would expect FDA to regularly weigh both the costs and benefits of new 
drugs and medical devices, along with regulations impacting them.  As discussed above, value of 
human life is critical to such analysis.  Therefore, it would be natural for FDA to have given 
consideration to the issue.  Precisely what FDA has and has not done in that regard is the subject 
of the following section. 
 
FDA Practice 
 
 I have examined FDA practice primarily from the perspective of its explicit use of 
valuations of life only.  Unfortunately, we have limited information as to an important piece of 
the puzzle – that is, whether FDA’s explicit values of life correspond to its actual cost per life 
saved in its regulations.  As discussed above in Part V, the few data points available do tend to 
suggest that the FDA acts with regulatory discipline.  Even without more examples of 
retrospective analysis, the agency frequently provides detailed explanations for its choices and 
specific uses of the values, making it possible to draw several conclusions from a close 
examination of the agency’s explicit practices.  Table 5, below, summarizes the explicit values 
used by FDA over the past ten years.215  I could not located any uses prior to 1993.  Much of the 
detail behind each instance could not be neatly summarized in a table, but appears in written form 
in the bullet points below. 
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Table 5 
Explicit Values of Life Used by FDA 
Citation 
(year) Category Impacted 
Nominal  
Value of Life 
(million, except life-
days or life-years) 
Value of Life 
(million 2003 
dollars) 
58 Fed. Reg. 2927 
(1993) 
Food $1.5-3.0 $1.9-3.8 
58 Fed. Reg. 53305 
(1993) 
Food $5.0-11.0 – infant $6.3-13.9 – infant 
61 Fed. Reg. 52602 
(1996) 
Medical device $5.0 $5.8 
61 Fed. Reg. 44396 
(1996) 
Medical device $2.5 $2.9 
62 Fed. Reg. 2218 
(1997) 
Dietary supplement 
and drug 
$5.0 – adult 
$11.0 – infant 
$5.7 – adult  
$12.6 – infant  
62 Fed. Reg. 55852 
(1997) 
Medical device $5.0 $5.7 
63 Fed. Reg. 24254 
(1998) 
Food $5.0 $5.6 
64 Fed. Reg. 36516 
(1999) 
Food $0.6-8.4 $0.7-9.2 
65 Fed. Reg. 69378 
(2000) 
Drug $5.0 $5.3 
66 Fed. Reg. 6502 
(2001) 
Food $630 per life day 
(translates to $5.0/VSL) 
$5.2 
67 Fed. Reg. 38878 
(2002) 
Medical device $5.0 $5.1 
67 Fed. Reg. 76056 
(2002) 
Medical device $5.0 $5.1 
68 Fed. Reg. 5428 
(2003) 
Food $274 per life day 
(translates to $2.2/VSL) 
$2.2 
68 Fed. Reg. 6062 
(2003) 
Drug $5.0 $5.0 
68 Fed. Reg. 12500 
(2003) 
Drug $2.0 $2.0 
68 Fed. Reg. 15404 
(2003) 
Medical device $373k per life year 
(translates to $5.0/VSL) 
$5.0 
68 Fed. Reg. 25188 
(2003) 
Food $5.0 $5.0 
68 Fed. Reg. 41434 
(2003) 
Food $5.0-6.5 $5.0-6.5 
69 Fed. Reg. 6788 
(2004) 
Dietary supplement $5.0-6.5 $5.0-6.5 
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The following summarizes my findings after a review of all regulations promulgated by 
FDA over the past ten years: 
 The first apparent use of a value of life estimate occurred in 1993, in an analysis of the 
impact (on the benefits side) of a food labeling regulation.  There, the agency engaged in 
an explication justifying the use of a value of life measure.216 
 The agency has overwhelmingly relied upon the willingness-to-pay methodology for 
computing the value of life, using values computed in the economic literature, rather than 
performing its own calculations.217  
 The agency has by-and-large used a value of human life of $5 million. (No explanation is 
given for the deviation in four cases.)  This is true even though the value has been used 
for a period of ten years.  In other words, no inflation adjustment appears to have ever 
been made.  The impact of this is that the value of life has fallen, in real terms by about a 
quarter.218 
 In spite of the failure to adjust for inflation, the agency appears to have been among the 
more consistent of federal agencies in using an explicit value of life. 
 When made explicit, FDA has generally used a 7% discount rate to discount human life.  
At times, this is explicitly to discount for a latency of benefit period; elsewhere, the 
rationale is not stated and appears to be to discount both for latency of benefit, and for 
future generations.219 
                                                 
216
 58 Fed. Reg. 2927 (Jan. 6, 1993). 
217
 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug. 11, 1995); 64 Fed. Reg. 36516 (Jul. 6, 1999); 68 Fed. Reg. 12500 (Mar. 14, 2003); 68 
Fed. Reg. 15404 (Mar. 31, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (Jul. 11, 2003); 69 Fed. Reg. 6788  (Feb. 11, 2004); see also 58 
Fed. Reg. 33860 (June 21, 1993) (comparing human capital approach to willingness-to-pay method). 
218
 $5 million used in 1993 is equivalent to $6.3 million in 2003 dollars. 
219
 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug. 11, 1995); 62 Fed. Reg. 2218 (Jan. 15, 1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 24254 (May 1, 1998); 64 Fed. 
Reg. 62746 (Nov. 17, 1999); 65 Fed. Reg. 52376 (Aug. 29, 2000); 67 Fed. Reg. 38878 (June 6, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 
15404 (Mar. 31, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (Jul. 11, 2003) (comparing effects when using both a 3% and 7% discount 
rate); but see 65 Fed. Reg. 69378 (Nov. 16, 2000) (3% discount rate used). 
 56 
 A number of critical inconsistencies appear in the manner in which the agency has applied 
the value. 
o Sometimes a range is used, sometimes just one value. 
o Generally a 7% discount rate is used but sometimes a range, or 3% was used. 
o When appropriate, the agency has broken down the value into statistical life-years, 
often demonstrating a high level of sophistication.220  However, sometimes this is 
done using an average number of statistical life-years or days, and other times, the 
number is individualized for a special population (e.g., children), or for a 
particular disease in question  
o Different academic sources are cited as the source of the value used, even when 
regulations rely on the same value.  These sources vary in currency – the oldest 
being fifteen years old from the date used.  
 Despite the different standards for each of the products regulated by FDA, it is interesting 
to observe that the agency’s use of the value of life in estimating benefits of proposed 
regulations has occurred across all types of products and regulations for the past ten years.    
Conclusions about FDA Practice 
 That the agency has inserted value of life estimates in a rather spotty and inconsistent 
manner supports two conclusions:  First, that the statutory and executive mandates have 
succeeded in neither prohibiting a weighing of benefits and cost, nor systematizing such analysis.  
Second, a close look at the specific manner in which FDA has used value of life estimates 
confirms many of the theoretical warnings discussed above.  As discussed above, even where a 
consistent value of life was used, it was applied at times in an inconsistent manner.  The most 
serious variations appear in the context of calculations using statistical life-years or life-days.  
                                                 
220
 See, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 41434 (Jul. 11, 2003). 
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Even when these values are derived from a consistent $5 million value of life, assumptions 
underlying the age of the population or the impact of a regulation on longevity can entirely drive 
the output.  This highlights an important caveat about using the value of life: applying a precise 
dollar value may tend to give the appearance of more precision and consistency than the actual 
analysis achieves.  It also casts doubt on the comparability of the various regulatory impact 
analyses within the agency, let alone across agencies, where even if value of life assumptions are 
synchronized, assumptions surrounding how to apply it might not have been.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper highlights both the importance of using valuations of life, and the concomitant 
risks.  Without understanding the fundamental economic mechanics of the valuation, it will be 
too easy for numbers to be manipulated for one-time political agendas.  And without appreciating 
legal mandates, judicial standards of review, and other pressures bearing down on agency 
commissioners, it is unlikely that any changes in actual practice will be successfully 
implemented.  To effectively make use of value of life analysis in regulatory decision-making, it 
is critical to understand both the technical economic basis for the valuation, as well as the 
regulatory and political arena in which such analysis will be performed.   
 Several specific lessons can be drawn from this research.  On the technical side, the 
difficulty of arriving at a precise value of life, and challenges around applying it consistently 
suggest that value of life numbers be used only in an advisory way.  Perhaps, they can be used in 
sensitivity analyses or to understand the orders of magnitude of a regulation’s potential benefits.  
However, comparisons should be made with great caution.  Full disclosure of all assumptions 
behind any values use is necessary to make such comparisons possible.  Furthermore, any future 
attempts by Congress to enact omnibus nondiscretionary cost-benefit legislation should be done 
 58 
with an appreciation of the potential for manipulation of value of life numbers, and hence, overall 
outcomes.   
 On the regulatory side, evidence from several federal agencies suggests that their behavior 
will not correspond to mandated cost-benefit analysis unless it is explicitly required to do so.  
However, such a requirement could have the negative consequence of either removing too much 
agency discretion or encouraging aggressive manipulation of data (rendering it worse than 
useless).  Perhaps one way around this quandary is to establish oversight of the cost-benefit 
analysis process removed from the political process (and hence, outside the OMB).  For example, 
neutral academic review boards could oversee and endorse or disapprove of agency analyses.  
These could be modeled directly off of FDA’s current Advisory Committees used to review 
product safety. 
 Despite the difficulties of effectively using values of life, agencies should not be deterred.  
A world of ad hoc decision-making, and exclusively implied valuations of life is not preferable.  
Only with explicit use and transparent disclosure of assumptions can the dialogue continue, and 
can technical and administrative procedures be improved upon. 
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APPENDIX 
